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The costs of linking customers with the public switched telephone network
have been ill-defined as costs common to all telecommunications services,
argued Alfred E. Kahn and William B. Shew here in 1987. Now as the pace
of change in telecommunications accelerates, Steve Parsons argues that the
proper assignment of these so-called loop costs is increasingly important, since
it affects many areas of public network law and policy, including rate-setting,
cross-subsidy tests, and franchise obligations. Parsons argues in favor of Kahn
and Shew's position and poses eight additional arguments for attributing loop
costs directly to the provision of access to the network. He traces the
misclassification of loop costs to careless nomenclature, misapplied micro-
economics, and the merging of inconsistent concepts and arguments. He
suggests how and why telecommunications policy, as it evolves, must embrace
loop costs as attributable to their own service rather than allocated to other
network-using services.
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Introduction
In a 1987 article in this journal, Alfred Kahn and William Shew' argued
that the costs of providing customers with access to the telephone network are
not common or shared costs to be borne by all telecommunications services.2
These costs, said Kahn and Shew, arise when carriers provide access to the
public switched telecommunications network and can be attributed directly to
their own unique service. Classifying such directly attributable costs as common
costs misrepresents the economic cost of basic telephone service and has broad
implications for telecommunications law and policy.
In the seven years since Kahn and Shew's article, the proper treatment of
the costs of subscriber access has become more important. The increasingly
competitive telecommunications industry has struggled to accommodate new
technologies under changing regulatory regimes. New participants continue
to enter the market, and the relationships among all entities are dynamic as
well.4 As previous markets and industries converge to form a hybrid of
1. Alfred E. Kahn & William B. Shew, Current Issues in Telecommunications Regulation: Pricing,
4 YALE J. ON REG. 191 (1987).
2. In the same time period as Kahn and Shew, John Wenders presented similar (although less
exhaustive) arguments in this area. See JOHN T. WENDERS, THE ECONOMICS OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS:
THEORY AND POLICY 177-83 (1987).
3. For example, facilities-based intraLATA competition is allowed in a greater number of states; Open
Network Architecture has been treated more fully at the federal level; the issue of unbundling of services
has arisen in many state jurisdictions; and issues of switched and special collocation, and transport rate
restructuring have been considered. See, e.g., Alexander C. Larson, Overview, 15 PULA xvii (July-Dec.
1992) (citing competition for LEC loops from line side interconnection and wireless technologies, recent
regulatory mandates to unbundle network facilities, and the FCC's collocation policies); Alexander C.
Larson, An Economic Guide to Competitive Standards in Telecommunications Regulation, in I COMMLAW
CONSPECTUS 31, 32 n.5 (1993) (citing the emergence of alternative regulatory plans in the state regulation
of telecommunications); MCI Rolls Out Plans for Local Network in Major Challenge to RHCs, COMM.
DAILY, Jan. 5, 1994 at I. ("MCI said Tues. it will spend at least $2 billion to build local telephone networks
throughout U.S. Local access network is part of larger $20-billion 'umbrella' strategy . . . called
'networkMCl."')
4. These changes occur through mergers, joint ventures, and other contractual arrangements. See
generally Andrew C. Barrett, Shifting Foundations: The Regulation of Telecommunications in an Era of
Change, 46 FED. COMM. L.J. 39 (1993).
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communication/information products and services, firms, regulators, and courts
must begin to resolve new policy issues. And although basic local telephone
service maintains high market penetration, universal telephone service is
perhaps more important today because the traditional support mechanisms for
universal service are being reevaluated. 5 Today, the treatment of subscriber
access costs affects many aspects of the industry: rate-setting decisions for
many telecommunications services, cross-subsidy tests, policies on unbundling
telecommunications networks, the franchise obligation to provide local service,
and methods of cost calculation.6
This Article reviews and supports the Kahn and Shew rationale. It also
offers eight additional arguments that noneconomists may find persuasive and
questions why, despite Kahn and Shew's detailed arguments, their position has
rarely been understood or accepted by regulators.
The distinction between directly attributable7 and common costs is
important: direct costs are those caused by providing a particular service;
common costs, on the other hand, are incurred by the firm simply by being in
business and cannot be attributed unambiguously to an individual product or
service. For example, for a firm producing two products, the expense of a
business license is not a direct cost; it cannot be attributed solely to either of
the products. Such unattributable costs are known as joint,g shared, nonunique,
or common costs. This Article uses the term common cost to include each of
these.
Subscriber access provides end users with a pathway to the public switched
telephone network.9 In some instances, the subscriber pays a monthly fee for
access and additional fees for use of the network such as local and long-
distance calling. Often, local use service and subscriber access service are
bundled together, and the customer pays a single monthly fee for both services.
For a local telephone company, providing subscribers with access to the
5. In part, this reevaluation is occurring because of many factors: collocation decisions at local
telephone companies' switches, possible restructuring of interexchange carrier access rates, the allowance
of facilities-based interLATA competition for some services such as toll, and the threat from alternate access
providers and telecommunications bypass generally.
6. This topic has particular relevance for fully distributed cost calculations. Fully distributed costs are
treated in Part IV. See infra note 71 and accompanying text.
7. Costs that are directly attributable to individual products are known by a variety of labels including
variable, marginal, unique, or direct costs. Fixed costs (those costs that do not vary with the volume of
output) may be directly attributable to an individual service (a service-specific fixed cost) or common.
8. Often in economics, the term "joint cost" is used to refer to the unattributable costs of producing
joint products or producing products in fixed proportions. Marshall and Taussig provide an early treatment
of this topic. See ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 388-93 (8th ed. 1920); F. W. TAUSSIG,
PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 214-20 (3d ed. 1925). If a fixed amount of wool and a fixed amount of mutton
are produced from each sheep, the expenditure (in the sheep itself would be a joint cost to the production
of wool and mutton. The existence of a joint cost does not preclude other directly attributable costs, such
as butchering costs or shearing costs.
9. Generally the term "access" without the modifying term subscriber refers to access to the local
telephone company's network by long distance companies. Such interexchange carrier (long-distance
company) access is treated only briefly in this Article.
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network accounts for a large portion of its costs. The costs of providing
subscriber access include the physical facilities between the customer and the
local telephone company's central office or local switch. These facilities
include: the loop, a pair of twisted copper wires;'" a portion of the capacity
of the infrastructure necessary for the loop such as conduit, trench, and phone
pole space;" and the electronics and space at the central office necessary to
connect the loop to the local telephone company's switch. The phrase "loop
cost" is used here to refer to the full costs of subscriber access.
Some argue that common costs can be allocated to individual services. If
a cost is truly common, it is unaffected by individual services, and any
allocation of such costs to individual services is economically nonsensical.'
2
Kahn and Shew do not argue that loop costs should in some fashion be
allocated to the service of subscriber access; rather, they describe why loop
costs are directly attributable to, that is, are directly caused by, subscriber
access service. They argue that loop costs are not common costs.
I. Kahn and Shew's Arguments on Loop Costs 3
Some analysts argue that loop costs are not directly attributable to
subscriber access service, but rather are costs common to all of the services that
use the loop. 4 Kahn and Shew present six pricing fallacies 5 that have
contributed to the misclassification of loop costs. Six statements corresponding
10. The loop could utilize a fiber optics glass pair. Alternatively, the function of the loop could be
provided by wireless facilities as would occur in a Personal Communications Services (PCS) or Basic
Exchange Telephone Radio Services (BETRS) environment.
11. Simply having a shared facility (such as a switch or a conduit) does not imply that all of the costs
of the facility are shared or common to the services using the facility. For example, an airplane is shared
by first-class and coach-class passengers. However, if an airplane is filled to capacity, each passenger
contributes to the exhaustion of the facility's capacity. In telecommunications, capacity costing is used to
reflect the directly attributable economic cost of using a shared facility. See generally Viktor Schmid-
Bielenberg, Bellcore's Switching Cost Information System (SCIS) Cost Model: A Practical Approach to
a Complex Problem (June 20, 1990) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
12. See infra note 70 and accompanying text. Because common costs are unaffected by any decision
regarding an individual service, allocating such costs to services is economically incorrect. Allocation of
common costs is fundamentally different from the proper attribution of costs. Economically proper cost
analysis attempts to attribute all of the costs actually caused by a particular service to that service. This
method stands in contrast to a fully distributed cost (FDC) calculation, which allocates common costs to
services, but in so doing also allocates to services costs not caused by those services. Thus, FDC methods
overstate the real economic costs of providing individual services.
13. Par I of this Article deals explicitly with Part 11 of Kahn & Shew, supra note I, at 200. Part II
of Kahn & Shew, supra note I, at 210, "Some Empirical Issues," is treated in the present Article as the
sixth item infra Part I11, section C.
14. See, e.g., David Gabel & Mark Kennet, Pricing of Telecommunications Services, h REV. INDUS.
ORG. I (1993): David Gabel & Mark Kennet, Pricing of Telecommunications Services: A Reply to
Comments, H REV. INDUS. ORG. 43 (1993): cf. Margaret M. Dalton & Patrick C. Mann, Telephone Cost
Allocation: Testing the Variability of Costs, 64 LAND ECoN. 296 (1988). Similar claims made in regulatory
proceedings are examined in Part 11 of this Article.
15. Kahn & Shew, supra note I, at 200-10; see also WENDERS, supra note 2 (addressing items one
and three of the six treated by Kahn & Shew).
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to the correction of the six fallacies discussed by Kahn and Shew are presented
and briefly described below; some of these arguments are refocused, presented
with different examples, and expanded beyond the original exposition by Kahn
and Shew.
First, subscriber access is a service in its own right. While customers
without access can place outbound calls from a coin phone or a neighbor's
house, most people value private and convenient access to the phone network
and the capacity to make and receive calls readily. More importantly, providing
subscriber access has costs that can be identified separately and attributed
directly to the service. Local telephone companies undeniably incur costs when
providing end users with access to the network. These costs are independent
of customers' use of the network, since they occur whether or not customers
actually use the network. A customer who demands subscriber access with no
intention of ever placing a call-for example, if the customer demands the
access service onlyto receive calls in emergencies-causes the same loop costs
as other customers that use the network frequently.
Second, in competitive markets throughout the economy, providers often
charge for access alone. Country club and health club memberships, restaurant
minimum fees, cover charges at bars, credit card annual fees, access fees for
on-line computer services, and monthly fees for bank checking accounts
illustrate this practice of charging fees solely for ingress. In real estate
contracts, access across adjacent property for a second entrance generally has
a positive price. Access-type services are often so specific to the asset that the
access facilities are purchased outright by the customer. For instance, in paving
a residential driveway the property owner generally buys the facilities providing
access-a route between a garage and the network of public roads. When the
cost of access to the provider is relatively low, the customer usually pays
nothing for access, as in parking at a suburban shopping center. Relatively high
access costs, for example, those associated with digging a well or providing
parking downtown, are likely to produce positive prices to customers for access.
Access bears conceptual similarities to an option clause in a contract. Stock
options, the right to purchase or sell stock at a given price, are bought and sold
in well-developed markets. Subscriber access to the telecommunications
network with local measured service is analogous to stock options in that access
provides only the opportunity to use the network. Actual use of the network
has a separate fee. In contracts for commercial office space, options to expand
beyond current leased space are common. Such options represent access to
additional space; the option itself generally has a price separate from the price
for the actual use of the additional space. Thus, charging for access alone is
a well-established commercial practice.
Third, local subscriber access and usage (telephone calls) are not joint
products. Joint products occur in fixed proportions-one yolk and one white
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from one egg. The cost of the egg may therefore be a common cost of
producing yolks and whites. However, telecommunications services generally
are not produced in fixed proportions. With each access line the customer does
not receive a fixed number of minutes of usage, such as thirty minutes of long
distance, fifty minutes of local usage, and ten minutes of three-way calling.
Some subscriber access customers place no calls whatsoever. These services
are produced in variable proportions, and for this reason the loop costs are
directly attributable to subscriber access service itself.
Kahn and Shew's fourth argument is that loop costs result from providing
access itself, even though other services may benefit from such access.
Economics clearly indicates that the cost of any activity or service is
conceptually independent of the benefit produced. The cost of providing a
customer with a gallon of water is independent of whether the customer drinks
it or fills a water balloon. Similarly, loop costs are directly attributable to
subscriber access regardless of whether the loop provides value in some way
to other services, customer activities, or even other customers.
Fifth, competitive markets may provide free rides."6 Opponents of Kahn
and Shew claim that 'long-distance service requires or benefits from a local
telephone network' 7 and that long-distance service should therefore pay for
a portion of the costs of the local network. In particular, they claim that in such
instances unregulated markets would not provide a free ride for long-distance
service. However, Kahn and Shew do provide examples of unregulated markets
in which free or nearly free rides occur.
Sixth, telecommunications service pricing is not a zero-sum game. 8
Changing the prices of telecommunications services to reflect more closely cost
and demand characteristics can lead to welfare gains (real gains to consumers
and producers), while price changes in the opposite direction can lead to
welfare losses. For example, consumers may be better off facing higher
subscriber access service prices and, as a result, lower usage prices.
Kahn and Shew also address four empirical issues relevant in determining
the components of loop costs that are properly attributable to subscriber access
rather than directly attributable to other services. 9 Their discussion sparked
a recent debate, which has produced additional support for the position that loop
16. Kahn & Shew, supra note 1, at 207. Although correct, this issue is relatively unimportant and
unpersuasive for purposes here.
17. Although this claim has some intuitive appeal, it does not withstand careful analysis. For example,
a telecommunications network, designed only for long-distance service, would likely be designed only to
serve high-use business customers and densely concentrated, short loop, residential, and business customers.
18. Kahn & Shew, supra note I, at 208. With a true zero-sum game, society would be indifferent
between different pricing regimes to recover the same total costs of providing multiple services.
19. Id. at 210-22: see Kahn & Shew, infra note 49.
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costs are predominately caused by the provision of subscriber access.2"
Although important, these issues are largely beyond the scope of this Article.2
I. Responses to Kahn and Shew
The 1987 article by Kahn and Shew has received some recognition in the
economics 2 and legal communities,23 yet it has been cited rarely by the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in its orders24 and has received
almost no attention in state public utility commission orders.25 Arguments for
and against the Kahn and Shew position do appear in discussions, presentations,
papers, comments in and testimony before regulatory commissions, and in
20. See Alfred E. Kahn, Pricing of Telecommunications Services: A Comment, 8 REV. INDUS. ORG.
39 (1993); William E. Taylor, Efficient Pricing of Telecommunications Services: The State of the Debate,
8 REV. INDUS. ORG 21, 23 (1993); see also Lester D. Taylor, Pricing of Telecommunications Services:
Comment on Gabel and Kennet, 8 REV. INDUS. ORG 15, 16 (1993). Although not part of the recent debate,
WENDERS, supra note 2, provides additional support for the position taken by Kahn and Shew. But see Gabel
& Kennet, supra note 14, at 1-3; ef. Dalton & Mann, supra note 14.
21. One of the major implications of this debate is discussed as item eight in Part HI below.
22. See, e.g., I ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS
xvii n.5 (2d ed. 1988); Gabel & Kennet. supra note 14: Kahn, supra note 20; Dalton & Mann, supra note
14; Lester Taylor, supra note 20; William Taylor, supra note 20; see also JAMES C. BONBRIGHT ET AL.,
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES 661 (2d ed. 1988); BRIDGER M. MITCHELL & INGO VOGELSANG,
TELECOMMUNICATIONS PRICING 155 (1991); Marcus Alexis et al., Report of the Blue Ribbon
Telecommunications Task Force to the Illinois Commerce Commission 21 n.22 (Jan. 1991) (on file with
the author).
23. See, e.g., MICHAEL K. KELLOGG ET AL., FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW 428 n.25, 432 n. 1,
452 n. 10, 453 n. 15, 465 n.23, 466 n.26 (1992); Frank P. Darr, Deregulation of Telephone Services in Ohio,
24 ADMIN. L. REV. 229, 237 n.50, 247 n.131, 306 n.614, 316 n.672 (1990), reprinted in 15 PULA 103
(1992); James M. Fink, The Battle Over the Rewrite of Illinois' Telecommunications Law: Is More Reform
Needed?, I I N. ILL. U. L. REV. 189, 196 n.28 (1991), reprinted in 15 PULA 527, 536 n.28 (1992); David
Gabel, Divestiture, Spin-Offs, and Technological Change in the Telecommunications Industry-A Property
Rights Analysis, 3 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 75, 101 n.114 (1990); Alfred E. Kahn, Deregulation: Looking
Backward and Looking Forward, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 325, 337 n.28, 346 n.47 (1990); Alexander C. Larson,
Costs, Allocations, and Regulatory Issues, TELEMATICS Apr. 1988, at 11, 18 n.2; Alexander C. Larson, Cost
Allocations, Predation, and Cross-Subsidies in Telecommunications, 14 J. CORP. L. 377, 378 (1989),
reprinted in 12 PULA 283, 286 n.3 (1989); Alexander C. Larson et al., Competitive Necessity and Pricing
in Telecommunications Regulation, 42 FED. COMM. L.J. 1, 29 (1989), reprinted in 13 PULA 219, 249 n.86
(1990); Alexander C. Larson & Mark P. Sievers, On the Ineffectiveness of Price Floors in
Telecommunications Regulation, 25 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 89, 120 n. 103 (1989); Alexander C. Larson &
Terrence J. Schroepfer, New Telecommunications Technologies and Regulation: The Case of Personal
Communications Services, 6 HIGH TECH. L.J. 271, 286 n.33 (1991); Warren G. Lavey, Innovative
Telecommunications Services and the Benefit of the Doubt, 27 CAL. W. L. REV. 51, 59 n.40, 72 n. 110 (1990-
1991); Mark E. Meitzen, Diversification of Telephone Company Service Offerings and Cash Cow Economics:
Who Gets Milked?, UTIL. POL'Y, Oct. 1990, at 43, 52 n.3; Mark E. Meitzen & Terrence J. Schroepfer, The
LECs' Transition to Full Competition: The Response of Regulation, COMPUTER LAW, June 1990, at 22, 26
n. 19; Dennis L. Weisman, Default Capacity Tariffs: Smoothing the Transitional Regulatory Asymmetries
in the Telecommunications Market, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 149, 149 n. 3 (1988); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Price
Level Regulation Based on Inflation Is Not an Attractive Alternative to Profit Level Regulation, 84 Nw. U.
L. REV. 665, 686 n.102 (1990) (book review).
24. See In re Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Dominant Carriers, Report and Order and Second
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 4 FCC Rcd. 2873 (1989).
25. It appears that the article by Kahn and Shew has only been cited in one state commission order,
In re Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Company, 114 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 299 (Or, P.U.C. 1990).
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commission orders to the telecommunications industry. In addition, the Kahn
and Shew position2" that loop costs are not common costs also appears in
unpublished manuscripts and in comments to, testimony before, and the orders
of state public utility commissions."
Prior to Kahn and Shew, many argued that loop costs were common
costs.2" These arguments have appeared in the economics literature,29 and
continue to appear in unpublished manuscripts and in comments to, testimony
26. This refers to the argument and is not intended to imply that the article by Kahn and Shew was
referenced or known.
27. TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 16, § 23.91, 18 Tex. Reg, 5723, 5728 (1993) (for differing reasons, AT&T,
the GTE Companies, and SWB object to the language in subsection (d)(6) that requires the LECs to exclude
the costs associated with the Network Access Channel Basic Level (NACBL) and Network Access Channel
Connection Basic Level (NACCBL) from the LRIC studies for residential and business basic local exchange
service); WENDERS, supra note 2; see, e.g., In re Inquiry into Policies and Programs to Assure Universal
Telephone Service in a Competitive Environment, Comments of Southwestern Bell Telephone Company,
Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, 14 n.5, Dec. 16, 1993 (FCC RM-8388); In re NARUC's Request
For a Notice of Inquiry Concerning Access Issues, Comments of Southwestern Bell Telephone Company,
appendix 11, 12, Sep. 2, 1993 (undocketed petition before the FCC) [hereinafter SWBT's NARUC
Comments]; In re NARUC's Request For a Notice of Inquiry Concerning Access Issues, MCI's Comments
on National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners' Petition for Notice of Inquiry Addressing
Access Issues, MCI Telecommunications Corporation, DA 93-84, Sep. 2, 1993, at 13-14 (undocketed petition
before the FCC) [hereinafter MCI's Comments in DA 93-84]; In re NARUC's Request For a Notice of
Inquiry Concerning Access Issues, Reply Comments of Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, appendix
11, 12, Sep. 2, 1993 (undocketed petition before the FCC); In re Rulemaking on LEC Cost Methodology,
Joint Comments of GTE Southwest Incorporated and Contel of Texas, Inc. on Proposed Local Exchange
Carrier Cost Methodology Rule, Project No. 9075, at 15 (Tex. P.U.C. May 1993) [hereinafter GTE's 907.5
Comments] ("However, the loop or NAC is not a cost common to other services or BNFs. It is a separate
component of the GTE Companies' networks and should be treated as such."); cf. Alfred E. Kahn, The Road
to More Intelligent Telephone Pricing, I YALE J. ON REG. 139, 140, 142, 143 (1984).
28. See In re Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company, 57 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 367 (D.C.
P.S.C. 1984) ("Where C&P treats access costs as 'direct' in nature, OPC views them as a common cost,
arguing that the access line is used jointly by local and toll services."); In re Mountain States Telephone
and Telegraph Company, 71 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 598 (Utah P.S.C. 1985) ("Mr. Buckalew ...
contended that there is no economic rule governing the assignment of common costs, such as loop costs.");
In re New England Telephone and Telegraph Company, 62 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 503 (Vt. P.S.B. 1984)
("Therefore, the joint cost of the access line should not be charged all to local calling."); see also In re
Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, 58 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 82 (Ark. P.S.C. 1984) ("This latter
argument-that local service should bear all the fixed costs of the local system-flies in the face of common
sense and contemporary economic theory about sharing of joint and common costs .... "); In re New
England Telephone and Telegraph Company, 55 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 296 (Vt. P.S.B. 1983) ("ITihe
loop costs or access line costs would either be considered common costs or would be allocated to the
message or usage portion because that is where the revenue is derived .... ); cf. Basil L. Copeland, Jr.
& Alan Severn, Price Theory and Telecommunications Regulation: A Dissenting View, 3 YALE J. ON REG.
53, 69 (1985) ("This approach does not, however, support the use of fixed charges for the pricing of access,
primarily because consumers do not demand access for its own sake."); In re Mountain States Telephone
and Telegraph Company, 82 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 64 (Colo. P.U.C. 1987) ("[Tlhe commission found
that determining cost of service according to a long-run incremental cost study, as proposed by the company,
could result in the basic exchange service market becoming a sump into which all joint and common costs
are thrown.").
29. See Gabel & Kennet and Dalton & Mann, supra note 14.
Telephone Pricing
before, and orders of regulatory commissions.3" In some instances, arguments
are inconsistent on whether loop costs are common costs.
3
'
Kahn and Shew's position on loop costs has not been embraced due to the
analytical complexity of the topic and continued misunderstanding in the
economics of cost analysis. Counterarguments, although often false, sound
initially appealing. In addition, as the article by Kaserman and Mayo in this
issue of the Yale Journal on Regulation suggests, regulators may be reluctant
to accept the Kahn and Shew position because it supports higher rates for
subscriber access service. Beyond the complexity of the topic, it may be that
regulators fear the political backlash from basic telephone customers facing
such rate increases.
30. See, e.g., In re Contel of Illinois, Inc., 119 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 284 (111. C.C. 1991)
[hereinafter Contel] ("Contel indicates that CUB's analysis begins with the incorrect premise that Contel
assigned all common and joint costs to either local access or usage."); In re Extended Area Service, 104
Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 239 (Or. P.U.C. 1989) ("The costs assigned to EAS can be grouped into three
categories, switching and transport, overhead, and contribution to joint loop costs."): In re Generic
Investigation Into Intralata Toll Competition Access Rates, Order No. 20,864, 1993 WL 475294, at *2 (N.H.
P.U.C. 1993) ("[Tlhe Commission concluded that NET's claim of subsidy was based on the mistaken and
misleading assumption that the non-traffic-sensitive (NTS) costs of the local loop should be assigned
exclusively to basic exchange services."); Petition of MFS Communications Company, Inc., for a Notice
of Inquiry and En Banc Hearing at 14, In re Inquiry into Policies and Programs to Assure Universal
Telephone Service in a Competitive Environment, (Nov. 1, 1993) (FCC RM-8388) ("First, the major
purposed subsidy identified by the LECs is based on a comparison of subscriber loop costs and monthly
local exchange service rates. This ignores the fact that subscriber loops provide access to all current and
future telecommunications services, not just to local exchange service, and therefore are the archetypical
joint and common cost of the network."); In re National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners
Petition for Notice of Inquiry Addressing Access Issues, /it re NARUC's Request For a Notice of Inquiry
Concerning Access Issues June 25, 1993 (undocketed petition before the FCC) [hereinafter NARUC's
Request] ("Subscriber loop costs would be considered shared costs for switch-based services .... ); In
re New England Telephone and Telegraph Company, 1991 WL 494307 at 6-7 (NH PUC 1991) ("Since NTS
accounts for approximately 70% of total incremental costs, NET's 'allocation of all such loop costs to basic
exchange results in grossly overstating the incremental cost of providing local service and grossly
understating the incremental cost of providing toll services."); In re Southern New England Telephone
Company, Docket No. 92-09-19, 1993 WL 378949 at * 103 (Conn. D.P.U.C. 1993) [hereinafter SNET ("The
Department also ordered the Company to propose plans for the allocation of local loop and common costs
(categories 10 and 11, respectively) to the other ten major service categories.").
31. See, e.g., In re Intrastate Access Costs and Intrastate Access Charges, No. 05-TR- 103, 1991 WL
426385, at * 10 (Wis. P.S.C. 1991) [hereinafter Wis. Access] ("Any allocation of common costs is inherently
arbitrary, but the allocation of investment and expenses incurred for the local loop is particularly difficult
because this investment is needed just to provide dial tone and the opportunity to make or receive a
telephone call, whether or not calls are actually made or received."); see also In re Amendment of Part 67
of the Commission's Rules and Establishment of a Joint Board, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Order
Establishing a Joint Board, 78 F.C.C.2d 837 (June 1980) ("It states that in considering the allocation of
jointly used NTS plant, there is by definition no cost imposed by the usage of such plant. Therefore, there
is, no non-arbitrary method to allocate the costs of NTS plant. The manual should operate so as to ensure
that all interexchange services pay a fair share of the cost of exchange facilities they use in common with
local services.").
32. See David L. Kaserman & John W. Mayo, Cross-Subsidies in Telecommunications: Roadblocks
on the Road to More Intelligent Telephone Pricing, II YALE J. ON REG. 119, 143 (1994).
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Ill. Further Support for Kahn and Shew's Loop Cost Position
Eight additional arguments not presented by Kahn and Shew on the
appropriate treatment of loop costs further explain why loop costs are directly
attributable to subscriber access and are not common costs. These arguments
fall into three categories: historical accident, separate perspectives and concepts,
and logical consistency.
A. A Historical Accident
First, the historical use of the phrase "common line" can be confusing.
Common line refers specifically to asset allocation purely for regulatory
purposes. Local telephone companies are regulated in the federal jurisdiction
by the FCC and by state public utility commissions for intrastate services. Rate-
of-return regulation in multiple jurisdictions necessarily requires the full
allocation of investments, expenses, and revenues to the individual jurisdictions
of regulation. This process is known as "separations and settlements. 33 In this
process a portion of the loop costs, called common line costs, is allocated to
the federal (interstate) jurisdiction. However, the phrase "common line" has no
economic meaning. The process of separations is only relevant to the arbitrary
split of revenue requirement for local telephone companies across jurisdictions;
these allocations and the terms surrounding them are unrelated to economic
costs.34 Unfortunately, the prevalence of the common line terminology
continues to obfuscate the nature of the cost of providing subscriber access.
B. Separate Perspectives and Concepts
Second, in dealing with the costs of subscriber access, it is easy to confuse
the perspectives of the customer and the service provider. Although the price
for subscriber access may be a common cost to the customer, loop costs are
not necessarily common production costs to the local telephone company. It
is certainly possible that a customer may purchase subscriber access for
multiple activities. For example, consider a hypothetical firm that has two
products--computer network consulting, provided locally, and personal
computer software, sold internationally. All the local telephone calls made by
the firm are for its computer network consulting, while all its long-distance calls
are made specifically for its software products. The firm pays a monthly fee
of $30 for subscriber access and pays separate charges for local and long-
33. See, e.g., WENDERS, supra note 2, at 173; Peter Temin & Geoffrey Peters, Is History Stranger than
Theory? The Origins of Telephone Separations, 75 EcON. HIST. 324 (1985).
34. Cf. Kahn & Shew, supra note I, at 194-99.
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distance calls. This firm may well consider the $30 subscriber access fee to be
a cost common to the provision of its two products, consulting and software.
A customer's use of subscriber access service and its role in the customer's
cost function have no bearing on whether these costs are common or directly
attributable.35 Surely the cost to a local telephone company of providing a
service is not a common cost simply because customers use the service for
multiple activities. 6 This distinction between cost to the customer and to the
provider is critical to a sound understanding of telecommunications costs.37
Economic principles indicate that most loop costs are directly attributable to
and caused by access to the network; such costs are not common or shared
costs to the local telephone company. When, under a franchise obligation, a
forecast38 indicates the need for an additional line for access to the public
switched network, certain undeniable costs are incurred by the local telephone
company.
Third, one should avoid confusing the concepts .of revenues and costs.
Cross-elastic or spill-over revenue effects and producer costs are independent
economic phenomena.39 Revenue effects are a function of customer demand,
while producers' costs are determined largely by input prices. Certainly
subscriber access service, local usage, and long-distance usage are likely to be
cross-elastic to some degree on the revenue or demand side.40 But while the
existence of a strong complementary effect between services may provide some
35. Rejecting this argument (for example, by accepting arguments that loop costs are common costs
because the customer uses the loop for many things) leads to a variety of logically untenable results. For
instance, a telephone company providing only a single product, subscriber access, would have its costs
classified as common costs despite having no other products to share the common cost. Such faulty
reasoning would lead to the conclusion that the cost to a highway department of constructing a segment
of highway would be considered a common cost to butchered meats, milk, stereo equipment, and dry
cleaning if each of the stores distributing these products were to use the section of highway to receive its
products. Similarly, a car would be classified as a common cost to motels since they are used to drive to
motels. These implications fly in the face of common sense; the premise on which they are based is simply
wrong.
36. If this were true, it would lead to the peculiar result that loop costs are common costs when used
to provide subscriber access to some customers, those using the service for multiple activities, but not
common when providing service to other customers. As customers move, the same loop would be considered
common at some points in time but not at others.
37. For example, Gabel and Kennet state, "we argue that access is a joint input which provides the
ability to place or receive local and toll calls." Gabel & Kennet, supra note 14, at 3. Their use of the term
input reflects their implicit focus on the use of subscriber access by customers, not by other companies.
They have analyzed the cost of access to the customer as an input into the customer's activities, not the
cost to the local telephone company of providing access. William Taylor provides a lucid response to Gabel
and Kennet; he notes, "The adjective 'joint' is used somewhat loosely in this section of their paper, and
their meaning is not clear to economists." William Taylor, supra note 20, at 27.
38. The franchise obligation requires local telephone companies to provide service in a timely manner
to all customers demanding the service; accordingly, the forecast of future demand triggers the expenditure.
The implications of franchise obligations are also discussed in Part IV.
39. Cf. WENDERS, supra note 2, at 177.
40. More precisely, one expects the coefficient of cross-price elasticity of demand between these
services to be negative, that is, the services are complements in consumption. See generally JACK
HIRSHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 116, (1976) (providing a standard definition of cross-
elasticity and specifying a negative sign for complements); see also Kahn & Shew, supra note 1. at 251-52.
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rationale for pricing one of the complements lower,41 cross-elastic revenue
effects do nothing to change the fundamental nature of the costs of providing
the services. Loop costs are not common to the provision of local and long-
distance usage simply because customers consider these services to be
complements.
Fourth, the direct link between loop costs and subscriber access becomes
clear when telecommunications services such as customer access and local
usage are unbundled. An unbundled offering of subscriber access and local
usage is generally termed local measured service or local message service.42
Under such arrangements, customers pay separate charges for access and local
use. Most telephone customers, particularly residential customers, purchase a
bundled offering of subscriber access and unlimited local usage, often called
flat rate service. Some claim that loop costs are directly attributable to basic
local service, including flat rate service.43 Such claims create confusion
because loop costs are not caused by local usage, yet they are billed as a
component of flat rate basic service. Providing subscriber access causes loop
costs; they are not caused by local service, long-distance service, or services
such as three-way calling. Considering only bundled offerings of subscriber
access and local usage, one may mistakenly conclude that Kahn and Shew
imply that loop costs are caused by local usage but not by toll usage."4 In a
local message or measured service environment, it becomes clear that loop costs
are not caused by local use, but by subscriber access, a distinct service
separately identified on the customer's bill. In a local measured service
environment, revenues and costs are clearly separated.
41. For example, a net incremental cost test, such as a burden test, incorporates cross-elastic revenue
effects. See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, SUPERFAIRNESS: APPLICATIONS AND THEORY 117 (1986) ("This requires
the investigator to take into account the cross-elasticities among the firm's own products in determining
whether the incremental revenues of product i are sufficient to cover its incremental costs."); c. WILLIAM
J. BAUMOL & J. GREGORY SIDAK, TOWARD COMPETITION IN LOCAL TELEPHONY 110-12 (1994); Alexander
C. Larson & Steve G. Parsons, Telecommunications Regulation, Imputation Policies, and Competition, 16
HASTINGS COMM & ENT. L.J. (forthcoming 1994) (manuscript on file with the author). In these articles the
use of foregone contribution from one product is considered an opportunity cost for another product. This
is an application of a net incremental cost test or burden test. If complements in consumption are involved,
a net incremental cost test will yield lower subsidy-free prices. However, Baumol himself suggests the gross-
incremental cost test as the relevant test of fairness to competitors. See BAUMOL, supra, at 118-19. The gross
test ignores cross-elastic effects.
42. Generally. local message service is only monitored or measured by frequency of calling. Local
measured service may also be monitored for distance, duration, and time of day of calls.
43. Technically the claim is correct since part of the cost of providing the bundled offering of flat rate
basic service is the cost of subscriber access. The issue here is to find the method of explanation that is
not only technically correct, but is least likely to be misunderstood.
44. See Contel, supra note 30; Wis. Access, supra note 3 1.
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C. Logical Consistency
Arguments that loop costs are common costs are often internally
inconsistent or are inconsistent with other developments of modern telecom-
munications.
Fifth, loop costs cannot be common to local and long-distance services,
since this would imply that the cost of providing subscriber access is common
across local and long-distance companies. Current law precludes regional Bell
operating companies (RBOCs) from offering interLATA45 long-distance
service.4" Generally, local telephone companies (often RBOCs) provide
subscriber access and local telephone service, while separate long-distance
companies (such as AT&T) offer interLATA long-distance service. The loop
costs that enable all these services cannot be common to local and long-distance
calling since costs cannot be common among independent companies.47 Costs
by their nature are specific to companies or decision-making agents.4
Sixth, Kahn and Shew address four empirical issues that are largely related
to whether loop costs are directly attributable to subscriber access.49
Regardless of the position one takes on these four empirical issues, each
position concludes that loop costs are directly attributable to individual services
and not somehow common across multiple services. One cannot agree with
Kahn and Shew on the empirical arguments and also argue that loop costs are
common costs.5° Their arguments suggest that loop costs are attributable
directly to either subscriber access or some other service, but exclude arguments
that loop costs are common. The empirical issues and the arguments
surrounding them imply that the costs are directly attributable to individual
45. Local Access Transport Areas (LATAs) represent the geographic line of demarcation between the
RBOCs and AT&T.
46. See United States v. Western Elec. Co., 569 F. Supp. 990, 1057 (D.D.C. 1983).
47. One firm may make a decision and take an action that causes external costs for other economic
agents-a negative externality. See generally PAUL HEYNE, THE ECONOMIC WAY OF THINKING 288, 326
(5th ed. 1987). However, a negative externality is not relevant here. Furthermore, it appears that the notion
of a negative externality has not been advanced to support the claim that loop costs are common.
48. See, e.g., JAMEs M. BUCHANAN, COST AND CHOICE: AN INQUIRY IN ECONOMIC THEORY 43 (1969).
49. Briefly, the four empirical issues stated as contentions are: (1) designing the network for long-
distance calling causes a portion of the costs; (2) higher levels of usage cause more and longer loops; (3)
loop costs associated with network upgrades are caused by new services and not "plain old telephone
service;" and (4) the marginal cost of subscriber access is markedly below the average revenue requirements
associated with providing it. These contentions are not supported by Kahn and Shew. See Kahn & Shew,
supra note 1, at 210-22. Contention (1) appears to be particularly irrelevant to policy decisions. Even if
this position is correct, one can consider the service of subscriber access as access to the public switched
network in its entirety and not as access simply to the local switched network or the intra-office network.
More importantly, these issues are largely irrelevant to policy determinations of cost recovery methods. See
Kahn & Shew, supra note 1, at 223: see also WENDERS, supra note 2.
50. This conclusion is true regardless of the side of the debate one chooses. If one believes, as in
empirical issue (2), that higher levels of usage do in fact cause more loops and longer loops, leading to
higher loop costs, then these costs are directly attributable to usage services and are not common costs.
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services-subscriber access, local, and long-distance usage-and are not
common to a group of services.
Seventh, the notion that loop costs are common costs conflicts with
emerging concepts of unbundling local-type services. In recent years, the ideas
of unbundling and Open Network Architecture (ONA) have received a great
deal of attention in telecommunications, 51 and the building block methods for
calculating costs at the functional level, rather than the service level, have been
proposed. 2 Simply put, these developments call for costs to reflect basic
network functions-access, switching, transport, etc.-rather than services like
local and long-distance calling. The loop function in some proposals has been
called the Network Access Channel (NAC).53 In some instances, building
block proposals have suggested that loop costs be treated as common costs.
54
However, by definition, the concept of the NAC as a separate function with
a separate cost is logically inconsistent with the notion of loop costs as common
costs. In essence, proposals that claim that subscriber loop costs should be
51. See Amendment of Sections 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations, (Computer Il),
Phase 1, Report and Order, 104 F.C.C.2d 958 (1986) (Phase I Order) (replacement of stiuctural separation
with nonstructural safeguards such as Comparably Efficient Interconnection in the short term and Open
Network Architecture in the long run), recon., 2 F.C.C.R. 3035 (1987), (Phase I Reconsideration Order),
further recon., 3 F.C.C.R. 1135 (1988) (Phase I Further Reconsideration Order), second further recon.,
4 F.C.C.R. 5927 (1989) (Phase I Second Further Reconsideration Order), Phase I Order and Phase I
Reconsideration Order vacated sub nom., California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1990) (California);
Phase 11, 2 F.C.C.R. 3072 (1987) (Phase 11 Order), recon., 3 F.C.C.R. 1150 (1988) (Phase II
Reconsideration Order), further recon., 4 F.C.C.R. 5927 (1989) (Phase II Further Reconsideration Order),
Phase II Order vacated sub nom., California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1990); Filing and Review
of Open Network Architecture Plans, Phase 1, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 4 FCC Rcd. 1 (1988) (BOC
ONA Order); Memorandum Opinion and Order, 5 FCC Rcd. 3103 (1990) (BOC ONA Amendment Order);
Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reconsideration, 5 FCC Rcd. 3084 (1990) (ONA Reconsideration
Order), appeal pending sub nom., California v. FCC, No. 90-70336 and Consolidated Cases (9th Cir.), filed
July 5, 1990; Memorandum Opinion and Order, 6 FCC Rcd. 7646 (1991) (BOC ONA Further Amendment
Order), affd, MCI v. FCC, No. 92-70189 (9th Cir.), Sept. 23, 1993; In re Computer III Remand
Proceedings, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 5 FCC Rcd. 5242 (1990) (ONA Remand NPRM); Report and
Order, 5 FCC Rcd. 7719 (1990) (ONA Remand Order), affd, California v. FCC, No. 90-70336 and
Consolidated Cases (9th Cir.), Sept. 23, 1993; In re Separation of Costs of Regulated Telephone Service
from Costs of Nonregulated Activities, Report and Order, 2 F.C.C.R. 1298 (1987) (requiring the Tier I local
exchange carriers to develop Cost Allocation Manuals as a nonstructural safeguard in lieu of structural
separation). For a concise history of ONA, see Chris L. Kelley, The Contestability of the Local Network:
The FCC's Open Network Architecture Policy, 45 FED. COMM. L.J. 89, 90-115 (1992); see also BAtJMOL
& SIDAK, supra note 41, at 121-24.
52. See, e.g., NARUC's Request, supra note 30; TEX, ADMIN. CODE tit. 16, § 23.91, 18 Tex. Reg.
5723, 5728 (1993) (the term Basic Network Function or BNF was used rather than the term building block).
In general, directly attributable costs of basic network functions rather.than services should be calculated.
Often, these proposals imply a framework for future unbundling of services. But see, e.g., SWBT's NARUC
Comments, supra note 27; GTE's 9075 Comments, supra note 27.
53. See TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 16, § 23.91, 18 Tex. Reg. 5723, 5734, 5735 (1993).
54. See NARUC's Request, supra note 30; TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 16, § 23.91, 18 Tex. Reg. 5723,
5728 (1993). However, other building block proposals and other proponents of building blocks do not
support the notion of loop costs as common costs. See, e.g., MCI's Comments in DA 93-84, supra note 27,
at 13-14 ("Secondly, the AIWG Report modifies the Building Blocks methodology by requiring that the
subscriber loop, or Network Access Channel ("NAC") and Network Access Channel Connection in the
Oregon terminology, be regarded as a shared cost of switch-based services. MCI does not support either
of the modifications to Building Blocks suggested by the AIWG Report (footnote omitted).").
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considered shared costs for switch-based services imply that building block
principles should not be applied to loop costs. Such an approach is inconsistent
and economically untenable. Similarly, the concept of unbundling loop/NAC
functionality from other functions is logically inconsistent with the concept of
loop costs as common costs. It would not appear possible to unbundle a
component that is a common cost, or to unbundle a component that creates joint
products.
Eighth, the notion that loop costs are common costs contradicts accepted
cost concepts for non-local services. Loop costs for private line service, special
access, or Centrex service15 are directly attributed to the service to which the
loop is dedicated. Implicitly, it has been accepted generally that loop costs for
such services are directly attributable to the access component of these services.
However, each of these services can in and of themselves have several service
components. For instance, Centrex service provides intercom calling (like a
limited local call), long-distance calling,56 and a host of vertical features such
as three-way and speed calling. The generally accepted cost methods for
Centrex calculate loop costs separately, for example, as a directly attributable
category; loop costs are not considered a common cost of all of the Centrex
options that might be purchased.57 Also, as customers move or change service,
the loop costs that were considered directly attributable to the access component
of a Centrex system in one year cannot logically be considered a common cost
the following year when the same loop is used to provide subscriber access to
residential customers.
These eight points affirm Kahn and Shew's position and strengthen the
case for attributing loop costs directly to subscriber access service rather than
considering such costs as common costs to be recovered by all services. The
approach recommended here creates consistent and symmetric treatment of
services, it attributes costs to the parties causing them, and it provides the
proper cost standard for sound legal, business, and public policy.
IV. Policy Implications
Kahn and Shew's position that loop costs are not common costs has
important implications for telecommunications law and policy. It affects the
methods used in calculating costs and decisions that depend on cost
information. In both business and public policy, cost information is important
55. This is a PBX-like business service that uses the local phone company's switch to perform the PBX
functions in some jurisdictions it is called Plexar.
56. Generally, some proportion of Centrex lines will be blocked from providing long-distance or other
outside calls.
57. Centrex cost methods and Centrex cost calculations certainly are sometimes challenged by PUC
staff or by intervenors in state regulatory proceedings. However, the challenges do not appear to suggest
that the loop costs should be considered as common costs.
The Yale Journal on Regulation
for service pricing, entry, and exit. Proper cost information is necessary for
testing for cross-subsidies and for determining the level of economically
efficient service prices. It also has important implications for defining the
franchise obligation of local telephone providers and for unbundling policies.
A. Economic Efficiency and Cross-Subsidy
Unlike discussions of whether common costs should be allocated to
individual services, the issue of whether loop costs are common or directly
attributable, and as such, marginal, affects proper economic policy
recommendations. 8 Economic efficiency requires that service prices be set at
their respective marginal costs. 59 However, for local telephone company
services, such prices do not provide revenue sufficient for recovery of total
costs since marginal cost does not include the common costs that are required
for operation of the company. Therefore, first-best efficient prices (prices equal
to marginal costs) are not economically viable.6" Second-best, or Ramsey-
efficient prices, are set according to marginal costs, demand elasticities, and
the total cost of the firm.6" Accepting the Kahn and Shew position does
nothing to change calculations of the total costs of the firm, but it has a great
effect on the calculated level of marginal costs for local service.62 If loop costs
are considered to be common costs, the marginal cost of subscriber access will
be very low (or perhaps zero) and the common costs to be recovered by all
services will be relatively high. In contrast, if loop costs are accepted as directly
attributable to subscriber access, then marginal costs for access will be high and
common costs relatively low. Accepting the Kahn and Shew position leads to
higher efficient6 3 prices for subscriber access and lower Ramsey-efficient
prices for other services.'
Accepting Kahn and Shew's position affects the cross-subsidy test for local
service and the range of subsidy-free prices for services in general, and raises
58. Allocations of common costs have no economic meaning. See infra note 70 and accompanying
text. However, the determination of the marginal or directly attributable cost of a service is important
economic information. The choice between methods of identifying such cost, which yield substantially
different results, has important economic implications.
59. For the purposes of this Article, marginal cost means the directly attributable costs or incremental
costs of a service.
60. See Kahn & Shew, supra note 1, at 247.
61. The Ramsey-efficient price for each service is above its marginal cost (with independent demands)
in an inverse proportion to its own price elasticity of demand; prices for less elastically demanded services
exceed marginal cost to a greater extent than those of elastically demanded services. See Kahn & Shew,
supra note 1, at 248.
62. The total cost of the firm is the sum of the marginal costs plus the common costs. Accepting or
rejecting Kahn and Shew's position only affects the categorization of costs within the total.
63. Both first-best and Ramsey-efficient prices for subscriber access would be higher.
64. The effect will be dampened to some degree since local telephone service/subscriber access services
have very low demand elasticities, and hence Ramsey-efficient prices for these services would diverge from
their marginal cost to a greater degree than other service prices: Cf. Kahn & Shew, supra note 1, at 247-52.
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subsidy questions that require legislative or regulatory treatment. By definition,
a service receives a cross-subsidy if the revenue from the service does not
exceed the incremental cost (the directly attributable cost) of providing the
service.65 Scope economies borne of common costs create a range of subsidy-
free prices, and a higher proportion of common costs creates a broader range
of subsidy-free prices. In essence, considering loop costs as common costs
would greatly expand the range of subsidy-free prices for subscriber access by
drastically reducing the lower bound of the range. Far lower, prices for
subscriber access would therefore be considered subsidy-free; this could create
political and regulatory pressure to lower subscriber access prices and raise the
prices of other services in order to recover the newfound common costs. In
contrast, accepting the Kahn and Shew position makes the incremental costs
for subscriber access relatively high and narrows the range of subsidy-free
prices.66 Relatively low subscriber access rates for residential and single-line
business customers therefore require a publicpolicy decision to subsidize these
services explicitly.
The Kahn and Shew position on the cost of subscriber access also affects
economically nonsensical cost manipulations such as fully distributed costs
(FDC). FDC methods generally begin with a measure of the directly attributable
costs of services and add an allocated portion of the common costs of the
company to each service or even to each unit of service.67 Such calculations
continue to be surprisingly common.6" If service prices are set equal to fully
distributed costs, adopting the Kahn and Shew position will have a substantial
effect on the pricing of telecommunications service: subscriber access prices
will be higher and other service prices will be lower.69 Fully distributed costs,
however, have no theoretical foundation, are necessarily arbitrary, and cannot
be used in any meaningful way to establish prices or set upper or lower bounds
for pricing. They are useless for establishing a standard for cross-subsidy or
65. See, e.g., BAUMOL, supra note 41; Gerald R. Faulhaber, Cross-Subsidization: Pricing in Public
Enterprises, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 966 (1975); Gerald R. Faulhaber & Stephen B. Levinson, Subsidy-Free
Prices and Anonymous Equity, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 1083 (1981).
66. The costs are higher than if they were considered common.
67. Generally, however, fully distributed costs employ embedded (historical) accounting measures of
cost, while economic measures of cost are prospective.
68. See, e.g., SNET, supra note 30; Ron Choura & Robin Ancona, Report on Intrastate Cost Allocations
for the NARUC Communications Committee and Subcommittee on Communications (October 1993) (on
file with author). Of 38 states responding, 22 answered affirmatively to the question, "Does your
Commission use a fully distributed cost methodology for ratemaking?" In the same survey, in questions
about allocating any cost for providing basic local exchange service, 13% of respondents allocate to
enhanced services, 8% to deregulated services, 8% to affiliated entities, and 21% to extended area service.
These numbers may be understated if any of the respondents believe that loop costs are not part of the costs
of providing basic local exchange service; in other words, that loop costs are common.
69. This relationship is relative to the prices resulting from rejecting the Kahn and Shew position. In
many jurisdictions, however, local services such as subscriber access services for residential and small
business customers appear to have been residually priced in the past. These prices are set after other service
prices are established in order to cover the remaining total costs of the company.
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anticompetitive practices. The academic literatures in the fields of economics,
accounting, and law contain a wealth of articles condemning FDC methods as
the basis for business or public utility policies.70 In comparison, literatures
contain very few favorable, rigorous analyses of FDC pricing.7 1
When loop costs are recognized as directly attributable to access, the way
these costs are calculated will affect other fundamental cost issues. One such
issue is whether long-run or short-run cost is the appropriate cost standard for
business and public olicy purposes.72 Kahn and Shew suggest, at one point,
that a long-run cost approach is more practical than the use of short-run
costs, 7 3 although there is a substantial literature supporting the use of short-run
marginal costs. 74 The very distinction between long- and short-run costs is
70. See In re Coal Rates Guidelines Nationwide, I I.C.C.2d 520 (1985); COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC
ADVISORS, 1965 ANNUAL REPORT 127 (1966); BAUMOL, supra note 41, at 134-36; JAMES C. BONBRIGHT
ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES 481 (2d ed. 1988); J. MAURICE CLARK, STUDIES IN THE
ECONOMICS OF OVERHEAD COSTS 14 (1923); ANN F. FRIEDLAENDER, THE DILEMMA OF FREIGHT
TRANSPORT REGULATION 133 (1969); PAUL J. GARFIELD & WALLACE F. LOVEjOY, PUBLIC UTILITY
ECONOMICS 140-41 (1964); WALTER B. MCFARLAND, CONCEPTS FOR MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING 46
(1966); W.A. PA7rON & A.C. LITLETON, CORPORATE ACCOUNTING STANDARDS 121 (1940), cited in
William J. Vatter, Limitations of Overhead Allocation, 20 ACCT. REV. 163 (1945); DUDLEY F. PEGRUM,
PUBLIC REGULATION OF BUSINESS 194-98 (1965); CHARLES F. PHILLIPS, JR., THE ECONOMICS OF
REGULATION 395-96 (1969); MILTON SPENCER ET AL., MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS: TEXT, PROBLEMS, AND
SHORT CASES 367 (4th ed. 1975); ARTHUR L. THOMAS, THE ALLOCATION PROBLEM: PART TwO 156-57
(1974); WENDERS, supra note 2, at 174; William J. Baumol et al., How Arbitrary is 'Arbitrary'?--or,
Toward the Deserved Demise of Full Cost Allocation, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Sept. 3, 1987, at 16; William J.
Baumol et al., The Role of Cost in the Minimum Pricing of Railroad Services, 35 J. BUS. 357 (1962);
William J. Baumol & Alfred G. Walton, Full Costing, Competition and Regulatory Practice, 82 Yale L.J.
639 (1973); William J. Baumol & Robert D. Willig, Railroad Deregulation: Using Competition as a Guide,
II REG. 28 (1987); Ronald Braeutigam, An Analysis of Fully Distributed Cost Pricing in Regulated
Industries, II BELL J. ECoN. 182 (1980); Ronald Braeutigam, Optimal Pricing With Intermodal Competition,
69 AM. ECON. REV. 38 (1979): Ronald H. Coase, The Theory of Public Utility Pricing and Its Application,
I BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 113 (1970); John Dearden, Cost Accounting Comes to Service Industries,
HARV. BUS. REV. (Sept.-Oct. 1978) at 132; Samuel Huntington, The Rapid Emergence of Marginal Cost
Pricing in the Regulation of Electric Utility Rate Structures, 55 B.U. L. REV. 689 (1975); Kahn, supra note
23, at 150; Robert S. Kaplan, Otte Cost System Isn't Enough, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1988, at 61;
Joseph R. Rose, Regulation of Intermodal Rate Competition in Transportation, 69 MICH. L. REV. 1011
(1971); George Sweeney, Welfare Implications of Fully Distributed Cost Pricing Applied to Partially
Regulated Firms, 13 BELL J. ECON. 525 (1982); Haskell P. Wald, The Theory of Marginal Cost Pricing
and Utility Rates, PUB. UTIL. FORT., June 22, 1967, at 15. See generally RAY H. GARRISON, MANAGERIAL
ACCOUNTING: CONCEPTS FOR PLANNING, CONTROL, DECISION MAKING 594-96 (5th ed. 1988).
71. But see COST ALLOCATION: METHODS, PRINCIPLES, APPLICATIONS (H. Peyton Young ed., 1985).
However, the fringe of the economics discipline that presents cost allocations in a positive light appears
to use the term to mean relatively mechanical methods of constrained pricing, and the costs created by such
calculations do not correspond to traditional concepts of economic costs. See Steve G. Parsons, A Decision-
Based Specification of Costs 18 (May 28, 1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
72. Traditionally, long-run costs reflect circumstances where there is total factor variability, in other
words, where no cost element is fixed in nature. Often, it is implied that there are no sunk costs in a long-
run cost calculation.
73. Kahn & Shew, supra note I, at 226. However, Kahn and Shew seem to suggest that short-run costs
are appropriate in at least certain circumstances. See id. at 225, 240. Also, Kahn appears to present
arguments in favor of using both long-run and short-run costs in an earlier work. See I ALFRED E. KAHN,
THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTI(NS 71, 85-86 (1970).
74. See RAY REES, PUBLIC ENTERPRISE ECONOMICS (2d ed. 1976); Roland Andersson & Mats Bohman,
Short- and Long-Run Marginal Cost Pricing: On Their Alleged Equivalence, 7 ENERGY ECoN. 279 (1985);
Gardner Brown. Jr. & M. Bruce Johnson, Public Utility Pricing and Output Under Risk, 59 AM. ECON. REV.
Telephone Pricing
inconsistently treated in the economics literature and is potentially misleading
to policy makers; it has little or no practical value.75 As the industry continues
to evolve, it is important that textbook concepts of long- and short-run costs
do not constrain sound applied economics and sound public and legal policy.
Sound policy requires that cost calculations properly reflect the economic costs
caused by the decision in question, regardless of whether such calculations
match either a theoretical long- or short-run calculation. Properly focusing on
the effects of business and public policy decisions is important in evaluating
loop costs as well as other costs.
B. Franchise Obligation
Kahn and Shew's position also affects the franchise obligation of the local
telephone company to provide subscriber access to all customers on a timely
basis.76 This franchise obligation, which requires local telephone companies to
place facilities well in advance of actual demand, appears to cause a large
proportion of loop costs. Once local telephone companies place the facilities,
a large proportion of the costs will not be affected by such standard business
119 (1969); John Craven, Peak-Load Pricing and Short-Run Marginal Cost, 95 ECON. J. 778 (1985); Jules
Dupuit, On the Measurement of the Utility of Public Works, 8 ANNALES DES PONTS ET CHAUSSEES 255,
261 (2d ser. 1944), reprinted in READINGS IN WELFARE ECONOMICS 255 (Kenneth J. Arrow & Tibor
Scitowsky eds., 1969); Ian S. Jones, Distortions in Electricity Pricing in the UK: A Comment, 47 OXFORD
BULL. ECON. & STAT. 275 (1985); William Vickrey, Efficient Pricing of Electric Power Service: Some
Innovative Solutions, 14 RESOURCES & ENERGY 157 (1992); Oliver E. Williamson, Peak-Load Pricing and
Optimal Capacity Under Indivisibility Constraints, 56 AM. ECON. REV. 810 (1966). Also, Lester Taylor
and William Taylor appear to believe that short-run marginal costs are relevant to analyzing at least portions
of this issue. See L. Taylor, supra note 20, at 16; W. Taylor, supra note 20, at 23. But see MICHAEL A.
CREW & PAUL R. KLEINDORFER, THE ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION (1986); FRIEDLAENDER,
supra note 70; Michael A. Crew & Paul R. Kleindorfer, Peak Load Pricing With a Diverse Technology,
7 BELL J. ECON. 207 (1986): Mohan Munasinghe & Jeremy J. Warford, Electricity Pricing: Theory and
Case Studies, in ELECTRICITY ECONOMICS: ESSAYS AND CASE STUDIES 1, 1I, 12 (Ralph Turvey & Dennis
Anderson eds., 1981); Gunter Schramm, Marginal Cost Pricing Revisited, 13 ENERGY ECoN. 245 (1991);
and M. D. E. Slater & G. K. Yarrow, Distortions in Electricity Pricing in the U.K., 45 OXFORD BULL. ECoIN.
& STAT. 317 (1983).
75. Parsons, supra note 71, at 13, 14; see also BONBRIGHT ET AL., supra note 70, at 661; WENDERS,
supra note 2, at 204; Armen A. Alchian, Costs and Outputs, in THE ALLOCATION OF ECONOMIC RESOURCES
(Moses Abramovitz ed., 1959), reprinted in READINGS IN MICROECONOMICS 159, 166 n.7 (William Breit
& Harold M. Hochman eds., 2d ed. 1968); Armen A. Alchian, Cost, in 3 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 404, 410 (1969); Baumol et al., supra note 70, at 357, 359, 361; Louis De Alessi,
The Short Run Revisited, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 450 (1967), reprinted in READINGS IN MICROECONOMICS 149,
157 (William Breit & Harold M. Hochman eds., 2d ed. 1968); James Earley, Marginal Policies of
"Excellently Managed" Companies, 46 AM. ECoN. REV. 44, 66 (1956); Peter Lewin & Steve G. Parsons,
Long Run Versus Short Run Costs of Electric Power Interruptions: A Cautionary Note, 7 ENERGY 1. 181
(1986); Lionel Robbins, Remarks Upon Certain Aspects of The Theory of Costs, 44 ECON. J. 1. 17 (1934):
Wesley J. Yordon, Evidence Against Diminishing Returns in Manufacturing and Comments on Short-Run
Models of Price-Output Behavior, 9 J. POST KEYNESIAN ECON. 593 (1987).
76. Franchise obligation is defined here as the minimal service requirement. See, e.g., Substantive
Rules, Public Utility Commission of Texas, § 23.61-4, Sept. 12, 1988. Weisman, supra note 23, describes
the implied contract of franchise obligation facing local telephone companies; see also Dennis L. Weisman,
Competitive Markets and Carriers of Last Resort, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Jul. 6, 1989, at 17.
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decisions as reducing the price of subscriber access to attract more basic access
subscribers who will have the option of using the existing facilities. Such a cost
structure, in the face of increasing competition in the industry, will require new
pricing approaches.77
Companies and regulators alike may need to reevaluate the franchise
obligation itself. Kahn and Shew note that the appropriate costs are those that
actually exist rather than those that might have existed for some hypothetical
network. 7' Regardless, franchise obligation decisions will influence the
forward-looking costs of new facility placement. Placing facilities to serve all
customers in a timely manner requires construction in high-cost, long-route/
long-loop, and low-density areas and the creation of substantial underutilized
capacity. These high-cost operations argue strongly for revising the franchise
obligation, though they may simply be unrealistic in the face of increased
competitive pressures, or may at least create costs greater than their value.
C. Alternate Price Structures
Alternate price structures for subscriber access service may be necessary
eventually, or at least economically desirable. Kahn and Shew stress that costs
that are not usage-sensitive should not be recovered by usage-sensitive prices.
One alternate price structure would require customers' outright purchase of the
portion of the loop closest to the customer, rather than the traditional leasing
arrangement. Such fees are not new, but are. not currently in widespread use.
The section of the loop near the customer's premises,79 which represents a
significant portion of loop costs and the costs of the franchise obligation, could
be sold, for example, directly to a real estate developer planning to build new
houses, apartments, or businesses in a subdivision. Such arrangements would
be consistent with commercial practices, since in unregulated markets customer-
specific or geographic-specific assets are often purchased outright or provided
through long-term contracts.
8 0
Price structures for subscriber access services need to reflect the structure
of subscriber costs.' These prices need to reflect the variation in loop costs
that result from the distance of the loop and the density of customers in the
77. See supra note 3.
78. See Kahn & Shew, supra note I, at 213, 223-28.
79. This section of the loop is typically considered part of the distribution plant; in contrast to the feeder
portion of the loop. Distribution facilities, by their very nature, tend to be relatively customer-specific and
geographic-specific.
80. It is unlikely, for example, that one could find a company willing to pave a residential driveway,
or install carpet in a bedroom, and lease the facilities without a contract to the homeowner. The costs of
digging a well, laying a concrete foundation for a building, or doing the layout for a company brochure
are other examples in which leasing without a long-term contract is unlikely.
X1. Cf. WENDERS, supra note 2; Kahn, supra note 27; Kahn & Shew, supra note I; William Taylor,
supra note 20.
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geographic area. The theoretical long-run notion of costs should not provide
an artificial constraint to pricing services which use existing facilities whose
capacity will not be exhausted during the time period of the pricing decision
in question. In particular, one should encourage the use of customer-specific
contracts in order to increase the utilization of the telephone network where it
is underutilized. When placing new facilities in response to actual demand, the
proper cost calculation for a customer-specific contract will yield a higher value
than would theoretical long-run calculations. Also, lower values will result
when existing facilities will not exhaust during the duration of the customer-
specific contract; the economic costs caused by the contract will in fact be
greater than or less than the theoretical long-run costs in these circumstances.
One of the benefits of increased reliance on customer-specific contracts is the
increased utilization of underutilized facilities-utilization is encouraged where
economic costs are low and discouraged where economic costs are high.
Conclusion
The costs of providing access to a network are not common costs to
services using that network. Rather, such costs are best considered to be directly
attributable to a network access service itself. This position has implications
for policies on testing for cross-subsidies, unbundling services, franchise
obligations, and establishing the level and structure of prices. One may apply
the Kahn and Shew position on the costs of access to networks beyond the
telecommunications industry. In the gas distribution, water distribution, cable
TV, and electric power industries, facilities are placed to provide the customer
with access to the relevant network. Apparently, at least a portion of the costs
of placing and maintaining these facilities is not sensitive to usage but is
specific to customers or geography. The Kahn and Shew position as expanded
here is clearly relevant to efficient price structures in these industries. 2
In the future, regulated companies and regulators alike will face the
challenge of consistently applying the principles presented by Kahn and Shew.
Over time, the divisions between previously distinct industries such as
telecommunications, cable television, computer-based information systems, and
even electric power, will continue to blur. The lessons from Kahn and Shew
are likely to become both more important and more difficult to apply. Access
to networks, facilities, data bases and other assets is likely to be a critical
component for many policy issues as markets, firms, services and customer
82. Electric power and gas distribution can be thought of as essentially single-service industries.
However, business and public policies are often established as if several services were provided: residential,
commercial, agricultural, large and small industrial. In addition, opportunities for other services may exist
within the same network: remote meter-reading, demand-side management, interruptible contracts, or leasing
of rights-of-way or other facilities.
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demands evolve. The ideas presented here should make the principles of Kahn
and Shew more apparent and ease their application.
